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Abstract
An individual has been subjected to some exposure and has developed some outcome.
Using data on similar individuals, we wish to evaluate, for this case, the probability that the
outcome was in fact caused by the exposure. Even with the best possible experimental data
on exposure and outcome, we typically can not identify this “probability of causation” exactly,
but we can provide information in the form of bounds for it. Under appropriate assumptions,
these bounds can be tightened if we can make other observations (e.g., on non-experimental
cases), measure additional variables (e.g., covariates) or measure complete mediators. In this
work we propose new bounds for the case that a third variable mediates partially the effect
of the exposure on the outcome.
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1 Introduction
Causality is a concept very common in real life situations. Is lung cancer caused by smoking? Was
contaminated water causing cholera in London in 1854? Can the court infer sex discrimination
in a hiring process? However, statisticians have been very cautious in formalizing this concept.
One reason may be the complex definitions and methods implemented to study causality. Another
explanation may be the difficulty of translating real life problems into mathematical notations and
formulas. The first step should be to identify the causal question of interest. This can be assigned
to one of two main classes: questions concerning the causes of observed effects, and questions
concerning the effects of applied causes. This basic distinction, all too often neglected in the
causal inference literature, is fundamental to identifying the correct definition of causation. To
clarify this distinction, consider the following example. An individual, Ann, might be subjected to
some exposure, X , and might develop some outcome, Y . For simplicity we take X to be a binary
decision variable, denoting whether or not an individual is given the drug, and take the outcome
variable Y also to be binary, coded 1 if the individual dies, and 0 if not. We denote by XA ∈ {0, 1}
the value of Ann’s exposure, and by YA ∈ {0, 1} the value of Ann’s outcome. Questions about
the effects of applied causes, “EoC”, are widely studied. For example, in medicine, randomized
clinical trials are one of the most rigorous ways to assess the effect of a treatment in a population.
In the EoC framework, at an individual level we would be interested in asking: “What would
happen to Ann were she to be given the drug?” or “What would happen to Ann were she not to
be given the drug?”. At the population level, a typical EoC query would be: “Is death caused
by the drug?” In this framework, a straightforward way to assess the strenght of causality is by
comparing P1 = P(Y = 1 | X ← 1) and P0 = P(Y = 1 | X ← 0), the two outcome probabilities
under the two different interventions [4]. This can be seen as a decision problem: we can compare
∗University of Cagliari
†Leverhulme Emeritus Fellow, University of Cambridge
‡University of Cagliari
1
these two different distributions for Y , decide which one we prefer, and take the associated decision
(give or withhold the drug). The difference P1 − P0 is known as the “Average Causal Effect”.
In contrast to EoC queries, that are mostly adopted to infer knowledge in the population, CoE
questions invariably require an individual investigation. For example, suppose that Ann died after
being given the drug. A typical CoE question might be phrased as: “Knowing that Ann did take
the drug, and died, how likely is it that she would not have died if she had not had the drug?”. In
this paper we will embed such causal queries in the counterfactual framework [7]. This is based on
the idea that there exist potential variables. If X is the exposure and Y the outcome, the potential
variable Y (x) is conceived as the value of Y that would arise if, actually or hypothetically, X were
to be set to x (X ← x). We denote the pair (Y (0), Y (1)) by Y. For an actual assignment X ← x,
we observe Y = Y (x). The potential variable Y (x′), with x′ 6= x, is then not observable, but is
supposed to describe what would have happened to the outcome Y , if, counterfactually, we had
assigned the different value x′ to the exposure X . Note particularly that it is never possible to
observe fully the pair Y.
The definition of a CoE causal effect is completely different from the EoC definition. It is
typically framed in terms of the probability of causation (PC), also called probability of necessity
[6]. Given that Ann took the drug and died, the probability of causation in Ann’s case is defined
as:
PCA = PA(YA(0) = 0 | XA = 1, YA(1) = 1) (1)
where PA denotes the probability distribution over attributes of Ann. For example, suppose that
Ann’s children filed a criminal lawsuit against a pharmaceutical manufacturer claiming that their
drug was the cause of her death. Using data on similar individuals, we would wish to evaluate,
for this case, the probability that the outcome was in fact caused by the exposure.
In such a civil case, the required standard of proof is typically “preponderance of the evidence,”
or “ balance of probabilities,” meaning that the case would succeed if it can be shown that causation
is “more probable than not,” i.e., PCA > 50%. However, simplistic or ad hoc definitions and rules
are widely and often wrongly applied in many courthouse. Given the possibly serious implications
of the probability of causation, it is important to studying methods capable of producing accurate
information.
From a statistical point of view, definition (1) involves the bivariate distribution of the two
potential variables associated with the same subject. However, only one of these can ever be
observed, the other then becoming counterfactual. For this reason, PCA is generally not fully
identifiable. We can however provide useful information as bounds between which PCA must
lie. Under appropriate assumptions, these bounds can be tightened if we can measure additional
variables, e.g., covariates [1], or—in the case that unobserved variables confound the exposure-
outcome relationship—gather data on other, nonexperimental, cases (Tian and Pearl [8].)
In this paper we propose a novel approach to bound the probability of causation in mediation
analysis. Mediation aims to disentangle the extent to which the effect of X on Y is mediated
through other pathways from the extent to which that effect is due to X acting directly on Y .
In § 2 we revisit the basic framework where we have information only on exposure and outcome.
In § 3 we focus on two different mechanisms: complete and partial mediation. In the former, the
exposure is supposed to act on the outcome only through the mediator, i.e., no direct effect is
present. In the latter, both direct and indirect effects are considered. In § 4 we compare the
bounds obtained in § 3 with those reviewed in § 2, and in § 5 we present our conclusions.
2 Starting Point: Simple Analysis
In this Section we discuss the simple situation in which we have information, as in Table 1, from
a randomized experimental study that tested the same drug taken by Ann.
P(Y = 1 | X ← 1) = 0.30 (2)
P(Y = 1 | X ← 0) = 0.12. (3)
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Die Live Total
Exposed 30 70 100
Unexposed 12 88 100
Table 1: Deaths in individuals exposed and unexposed to the same drug taken by Ann.
We see that, in the experimental population, individuals exposed to the drug (X ← 1) were more
likely to die than those unexposed (X ← 0), by 18 percentage points. So can the court infer that
it was Ann’s taking the drug that caused her death? More generally: Is it correct to use such
experimental results, concerning a population, to say something about a single individual? This
“Group-to-individual” (G2i) issue is discussed by Dawid [2]. The simple difference between (2)
and (3) is not sufficient to infer causation for a single external individual.
To make progress we add a further assumption that the event of Ann’s exposure, XA, is
independent of her potential response pair YA:
XA⊥⊥YA. (4)
Property (4) parallels the “no-confounding” property Xi⊥⊥Yi that holds for individuals i
in the experimental study on account of randomization. We further suppose that Ann is ex-
changeable with the individuals in the experiment, i.e., she could be considered as a subject
in the experimental population. On account of (4) and exchangeability, PCA in (1) reduces to
PCA = P(Y (0) = 0 | Y (1) = 1)—but we can not fully identify this from the data. In fact we can
never observe the joint event (Y (0) = 0;Y (1) = 1), since at least one of Y (0) and Y (1) must be
counterfactual. In particular, we can never learn anything about the dependence between Y (0)
and Y (1). However, even without making any assumptions about this dependence, we can derive
the following inequalities (Dawid et al. [4]):
max
{
0, 1−
1
RR
}
≤ PCA ≤
min{P(Y = 0 | X ← 0),P(Y = 1 | X ← 1)}
P(Y = 1 | X ← 1)
, (5)
where
RR =
P(Y = 1 | X ← 1)
P(Y = 1 | X ← 0)
(6)
is the experimental risk ratio between exposed and unexposed. These bounds can be estimated
from the experimental data using the population death rates in equations (2) and (3).
In many cases of interest (such as Table 1), we have
P(Y = 1 | X ← 0) < P(Y = 1 | X ← 1) < P(Y = 0 | X ← 0).
Then the lower bound in (5) will be non-trivial, while the upper bound will be 1, so vacuous.
Since, in Table 1, the exposed are 2.5 times as likely to die as the unexposed (RR = 30/12 = 2.5),
we have enough confidence to infer causality in Ann’s case, since 0.60 ≤ PCA ≤ 1.
3 Bounds in Mediation
In this Section we bound the probability of causation for a case where a third variable, M , is
involved in the causal pathway between the exposure X and the outcome Y . We first review the
results of Dawid et al. [3] for the case of complete mediation, where no direct effect is present
between exposure and outcome but all the effect is mediated by M . In addition we derive new
bounds for PCA in mediation analysis when a partial mediation mechanism is in operation.
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3.1 Complete mediation (Dawid et al. [3])
The case of no direct effect is intuitively described by Figure 1. Applications where this assumption
might be plausible is in the treatment of ovarian cancer (Silber et al. [5]), where X represents
management either by a medical oncologist or by a gynaecological oncologist, M is the intensity
of chemotherapy prescribed, and Y is death within 5 years. We shall be interested in the case that
M is observed in the experimental data but is not observed for Ann, and see how this additional
experimental evidence can be used to refine the bounds on PCA.
X M Y
Figure 1: Graph representing a mediator M , responding to exposure X and affecting response Y .
There is no direct effect, unmediated by M , of X on Y .
We now introduceM(x) to denote the potential value ofM when X ← x, and Y ∗(m) to denote
the potential value of Y when M ← m. Then Y (x) := Y ∗{M(x)}. We define M := (M(0),M(1))
and Y∗ := (Y ∗(0), Y ∗(1)).
We suppose that none of the causal mechanisms depicted in Figure 1 are confounded–expressed
mathematically by assuming mutual independence between X , M and Y∗ (both for experimental
individuals, and for Ann). These assumptions imply no overall confounding (as in (4)), the Markov
property Y ⊥⊥X |M , and the following bounds in this case of complete mediation:
max
{
0, 1−
1
RR
}
≤ PCA ≤
Num
P(Y = 1 | X ← 1)
, (7)
where the numerator, Num, is given in Table 2. We see from (7) that knowing a mediator does not
improve the lower bound. For the upper bound, one has to consider various scenarios according
to different choices of the estimable marginal probabilities in Table 2.
a ≤ b a > b
c ≤ d a · c+ (1 − d)(1− b) b · c+ (1− d)(1 − a)
c > d a · d+ (1− c)(1− b) b · d+ (1 − a)(1− c)
Table 2: Numerator of upper bound for PCA in complete mediation anlaysis. Here a = P(M(0) =
0), b = P(M(1) = 1), c = P(Y ∗(0) = 0) and d = P (Y ∗(1) = 1).
Note that, given the no-confounding assumptions, the entries in Table 2 are all estimable from
the experimental data:
a = P(M = 0 | X ← 0)
b = P(M = 1 | X ← 1)
c = P(Y = 0 |M ← 0)
d = P(Y = 1 |M ← 1).
3.2 Partial mediation
The situation described by Figure 1 is unlikely to hold in many real life situations. Situations
such as that represented informally by Figure 2, that allow both direct and indirect effects, are
more plausible. In this Section we derive new bounds for the probability of causation when a
partial mediator is involved in the causal pathway. We now define Y ∗(x,m) as the potential
value of the outcome Y after setting both exposure, X ← x, and mediator, M ← m. Then
Y (x) = Y ∗(x,M(x)). We make the following assumptions, both for Ann and for the individuals
in the experiment:
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X Y
M
Figure 2: Graph illustrating a partial mediation mechanism between an exposure X , an outcome
Y , and a mediator M
A1: Y ∗(x,m)⊥⊥M | X (no M–Y confounding)
A2: Y ∗(x,m)⊥⊥X (no X–Y confounding)
A3: M(x)⊥⊥X (no X–M confounding).
Assumption A1 expresses independence, given X , between a potential value Y ∗(x,m), that would
arise on setting exposure and mediator to particular values, and the pair of potential outcomes
(M(0),M(1)). It can be seen as a strengthening of the univariate hypothesis Y ∗(x,m)⊥⊥M(x) | X .
Note that A1 and A2 are together equivalent to the single requirement:
A12: Y ∗(x,m)⊥⊥ (M, X).
Because we have supposed that Ann is exchangeable with the individuals in the experiment,
we have
PCA = P(Y (0) = 0 | X ← 1, Y (1) = 1) =
P(Y (0) = 0, Y (1) = 1 | X ← 1)
P(Y (1) = 1 | X ← 1)
. (8)
Given the no-confounding assumptions, the denominator of (8) is P(Y = 1 | X ← 1), which is
estimable. However, the numerator of (8) involves the joint distribution of the pair Y of potential
outcomes, and this is not estimable from the data, in view of the fact that it is never possible to
observe both Y (0) and Y (1) simultaneously. We can however bound this numerator in terms of
estimable quantities, using the fact that, for any events A and B, and any probability distribution
P,
max{P(A) + P(B) − 1, 0} ≤ P(A ∩B) ≤ min{P(A),P(B)}. (9)
Using (9), we can obtain an upper bound for the numerator as:
P(Y (0) = 0, Y (1) = 1 | X ← 1) = P(Y ∗(0,M(0)) = 0, Y ∗(1,M(1)) = 1 | X ← 1)
=
∑
m0
∑
m1
P(Y ∗(0, m0) = 0, Y
∗(1,m1) = 1 | M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1, X ← 1) (10)
× P(M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1 | X ← 1)
≤
∑
m0
∑
m1
min{P(Y ∗(0, m0) = 0 | M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1, X ← 1),
P(Y ∗(1,m1) = 1 | M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1, X ← 1)}
×min{P(M(0) = m0 | X ← 1),P(M(1) = m1 | X ← 1)}
=
∑
m0
∑
m1
min{P(Y
∗
(0,m0) = 0),P(Y
∗
(1,m1) = 1)}
×min{P(M(0) = m0),P(M(1) = m1}, (11)
on using assumptions A12 and A3. That is,
P(Y (0) = 0, Y (1) = 1 | X ← 1) ≤
min{P(Y ∗(0, 0) = 0),P(Y ∗(1, 0) = 1)} ×min{P(M(0) = 0),P(M(1) = 0)} (12)
+min{P(Y ∗(0, 0) = 0),P(Y ∗(1, 1) = 1)} ×min{P(M(0) = 0),P(M(1) = 1)} (13)
+min{P(Y ∗(0, 1) = 0),P(Y ∗(1, 0) = 1)} ×min{P(M(0) = 1),P(M(1) = 0)} (14)
+min{P(Y ∗(0, 1) = 0),P(Y ∗(1, 1) = 1)} ×min{P(M(0) = 1),P(M(1) = 1)}. (15)
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It can be shown that similarly applying the lower bound of (9) to (10) yields the same lower
bound as obtained in § 2 and § 3.1, so that the lower bound is not improved by knowledge of a
mediation mechanism.
Assumptions A12 and A3 allow us to estimate the terms (12)–(15) in the above upper bound
from the data:
P(Y ∗(x,m) = y) = P(Y = y | X ← x,M ← m)
P(M(x) = m) = P(M = m | X ← x).
4 Comparisons
In this Section we compare the bounds found in the simple analysis framework of § 2 with those
obtained by considering a complete mediation mechanism, as in § 3.1, and those obtained by
considering a partial mediation mechanism, as in § 3. We focus on comparing these bounds to
obtain the best information from the data.
The numerator of the upper bound for PCA in (5), which ignores the mediator, may be written
as
min{α+ β, γ + δ}, (16)
where
α = P(Y ∗(0, 0) = 0)P(M(0) = 0)
β = P(Y ∗(0, 1) = 0)P(M(0) = 1)
γ = P(Y ∗(1, 0) = 1)P(M(1) = 0)
δ = P(Y ∗(1, 1) = 1)P(M(1) = 1).
We see that both (12) and (13) are smaller than or equal to α, while both (14) and (15) are
smaller than or equal to β. So the upper bound allowing for partial mediation, which is the sum
of (12), (13), (14) and (15), cannot exceed 2 (α+ β) = 2P(Y (0) = 0) = 2P(Y = 0 | X ← 0); and
similarly cannot exceed 2P(Y = 1 | X ← 1). Thus, the upper bound for the numerator, when
accounting for the mediator, can not exceed twice that obtained by ignoring it, as given by (5).
However, as we will see in § 4.1, it could be larger or smaller than that simpler bound. On the
other hand, we do not obtain a different lower bound.
In the special case of complete mediation, Y ∗(0,m) = Y ∗(1,m), = Y ∗(m), say. Thus the terms
with m0 6= m1 in (10) must be 0. This leads to the following upper bound:
P(Y (0) = 0, Y (1) = 1 | X ← 1) ≤
min{P(Y ∗(0) = 0),P(Y ∗(1) = 1)} ×min{P(M(0) = 0),P(M(1) = 1)}+
+min{P(Y ∗(1) = 0),P(Y ∗(0) = 1)} ×min{P(M(0) = 1),P(M(1) = 0)},
in agreement with Table 2. Since we have eliminated the terms (12) and (15) appearing in the
general case, the upper bound obtained in this case of complete mediation is never bigger than
that obtained from the general expression (12)+(13)+(14)+(15); nor, since (13) ≤ α while (14)
≤ β, can it be bigger than the bound (5) obtained on ignoring the knowledge of the complete
mediation mechanism.
4.1 Examples
To show that, in the case of partial mediation, taking account of information about the mediator
may, but need not, yield a tighter upper bound, we consider two cases with different experimental
data as given respectively by Table 3 and Table 4.
Suppose now we can also observe a partial mediator M . We might then observe the following
probabilities, consistent with Table 3:
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Die Live Total
Exposed 69 31 100
Unexposed 24 76 100
Table 3: Experimental data 1
Die Live Total
Exposed 78 22 100
Unexposed 32 68 100
Table 4: Experimental data 2
P(Y ∗(0, 0) = 0) = 0.98 P(Y ∗(0, 1) = 0) = 0.165
P(Y ∗(1, 0) = 0) = 0.315 P(Y ∗(1, 1) = 0) = 0.143
P(M(0) = 0) = 0.73 P(M(1) = 0) = 0.981
We then obtain: 0.65 ≤ PCA ≤ 0.81 when accounting for the mediator, and 0.65 ≤ PCA ≤
1 when ignoring it. In this case, knowledge of the partial mediation mechanism is helpful in
improving the upper bound.
On the other hand, suppose we observe the following probabilities, consistent with Table 4:
P(Y ∗(0, 0) = 0) = 0.98 P(Y ∗(0, 1) = 0) = 0.67
P(Y ∗(1, 0) = 0) = 0.09 P(Y ∗(1, 1) = 0) = 0.27
P(M(0) = 0) = 0.04 P(M(1) = 0) = 0.26
We now obtain: 0.59 ≤ PCA ≤ 0.95 when accounting for the mediator, but 0.59 ≤ PCA ≤ 0.88
when ignoring it. So in this case knowledge of mediation has not been helpful.
5 Conclusions
Bounding the probability of causation in mediation analysis is an important problem for appli-
cations. By taking account of a complete mediation mechanism we can never do worse than by
ignoring it. However, complete mediation is not always reasonable. In the case of partial me-
diation, the upper bound obtained by taking account of it may be greater or smaller than that
obtained by ignoring it. We can thus compute both upper bounds and take the smaller.
This work has several possible extensions. It would be interesting to extend our theoretical
formulas to cases combining information on both covariates and mediators. Another promising
extension arises on making connections with copula theory, where PC can be obtained as a function
of the estimable quantities P(Y (0) = 0) and P(Y (1) = 1) together with an appropriate copula.
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